An air-gapped backup is a copy of your data kept somewhere an attacker cannot reach or delete, even if they take control of your main systems. The aim is simple: when ransomware or a compromised administrator account destroys everything it can see, one clean copy is still there.
Traditionally "air gap" meant a physical break, such as tapes in a safe. In the cloud it means a logical one: separate accounts, separate credentials and a lock that stops deletion. The backup must not be reachable with the same credentials that were just compromised.
Three levels of protection in AWS Backup
| Level | What it does | What it does not do |
|---|---|---|
| Standard backup vault | Stores recovery points in your account | Can be deleted by anyone with enough permissions |
| Vault with Vault Lock in compliance mode | Write-once protection: once the cooling-off period (at least 3 days) ends, the lock cannot be removed by anyone, including the account owner and AWS | Backups can be restored only by the account that owns the vault |
| Logically air-gapped vault | Always locked in compliance mode; holds backups in an AWS Backup service-owned account; can be shared with other AWS accounts (including in other organisations) so backups can be restored from there | Supports only some resource types, and unencrypted Aurora, DocumentDB and Neptune clusters are not supported |
AWS recommends cross-Region copies in logically air-gapped vaults for greater resilience, and offers multi-party approval so backups stay recoverable even if the account that owns the vault is closed or inaccessible.
Limits that matter
- A lock protects against deletion, not against bad data. If ransomware has already encrypted a server before the backup runs, you have locked a bad copy. Keep several restore points, and retention long enough to reach back before the infection.
- Locks are permanent. Because a compliance-mode lock cannot be undone after the cooling-off period, set retention carefully: backups cannot be deleted early and still cost storage.
- A backup you have not restored is a hope. Practise restoring into a clean account, from the isolated copy, to a stated recovery point.
Air-gapped backups are one layer of ransomware recovery, alongside a clean recovery environment and a rehearsed runbook. For why backups alone fall short, see Why "We Have Backups" Is Not a DR Plan. Designing and testing this layer is part of a Yemberzal Disaster Recovery Assessment.